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Research Article
Humans are a hyper-cooperative species, and the evolu-
tion of human cooperation and its underlying mechanisms 
continue to be a matter of debate (Richerson et al., 2016; 
Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). Our goal was 
therefore to investigate whether one such mechanism, 
namely action corepresentation during joint action, may 
be present in another highly cooperative primate species, 
the common marmoset monkey (Callithrix jacchus).
When human social partners are jointly engaged in 
a cooperative task, they corepresent each other’s 
actions—for instance, in the joint Simon task (Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). This task is based on the 
individual Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967), which 
is the compatibility effect arising when an irrelevant 
feature of a test stimulus interferes with the response, 
as when a stimulus is played back from one side, 
whereas the required response is on the opposite side. 
For instance, in the auditory version (Ruys & Aarts, 
2010) of the Simon task (full task), subjects have to 
learn to discriminate between two sound stimuli, “L” 
and “R,” and choose the corresponding left- or right-
hand response option. If the stimuli are played back 
from either the left-hand or the right-hand side of the 
subject, the task is easier in compatible trials (i.e., when 
stimulus “L,” requiring a left-hand response, is played 
back from the left-hand side, and stimulus “R,” requiring 
a right-hand response, is played back from the right-
hand side) than in incompatible trials (i.e., when stimu-
lus “L” is played back from the right-hand side, and 
stimulus “R” is played back from the left-hand side). 
This compatibility effect is referred to as the Simon 
effect. However, when subjects have to solve only half 
of the task because one response option is not available 
(i.e., the half task), the corresponding stimulus can be 
ignored, and the compatibility or Simon effect disap-
pears. Thus, when only one response option is available 
(e.g., on the right-hand side) and both stimuli are used, 
the task is equally difficult regardless of whether the 
stimuli are played back from the right- or left-hand side. 
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Intriguingly, the Simon effect reappears in a joint task 
condition. Here, subjects are still responsible for only 
one half of the task, while their partner must solve the 
other half. Subjects thus behave as if they were respon-
sible not only for their own half of the task but also for 
their partner's half, suggesting that they represent not 
only their own actions but also their partner’s (Butterfill, 
2012; Ruissen & de Bruijn, 2016; Vesper, Butterfill, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010).
The joint Simon effect is modulated by several social 
factors. It is stronger among friends compared with 
nonfriends (Hommel, Colzato, & Van Den Wildenberg, 
2009), among in-group compared with out-group mem-
bers (McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013), and after 
nasal oxytocin application (Ruissen & de Bruijn, 2015), 
and it is positively correlated with empathy among friends 
(Ford & Aberdein, 2015). Furthermore, it appears when 
participants are told they are playing with a partner in 
a different room but not when they are told they are 
playing with a computer (Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 
2008; see also Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011, for 
results from the similar Eriksen flanker task) and when 
they believe partners have voluntary control over their 
actions compared with when partners' actions are being 
controlled by a machine (Atmaca et al., 2011).
Some work suggests a link with theory-of-mind 
understanding. There is no evidence for corepresenta-
tion in 2- to 3-year-old children (Milward, Kita, & 
Apperly, 2014), but it has been shown in 4- and 5-year-
olds (Milward et al., 2014; Saby, Bouquet, & Marshall, 
2014), where individual differences are linked to inhibi-
tory control and theory-of-mind abilities (Milward, Kita, 
& Apperly, 2016). Likewise, Humphreys and Bedford 
(2011) found no joint effect in patients with theory-of-
mind deficits. However, it is also likely that the percep-
tion of agency, defined as perceiving an agent as the 
initiator or causal source of an action, rather than full-
fledged intentionality and thus theory of mind, is suf-
ficient for the emergence of a joint Simon effect (Stenzel 
et al., 2014).
At the same time, however, low-level perceptual pro-
cesses can be sufficient to elicit joint Simon effects 
(Dolk et  al., 2014; Klempova & Liepelt, 2016). For 
instance, a joint Simon effect has been reported when 
the “partner” was an inanimate Japanese waving cat 
(Lien, Pedersen, & Proctor, 2015). This gave rise to the 
referential-response-coding approach, a nonsocial 
account of this coaction effect (Dolk et al., 2014).
To explore the evolutionary origin of the joint Simon 
effect, we investigated whether it would also be present 
in common marmoset monkeys. Common marmosets 
meet a suite of prerequisites identified by Sebanz, 
Bekkering, and Knoblich (2006) as relevant for corepre-
sentation in joint tasks. First, as the only true cooperative 
breeders among primates besides humans, common mar-
mosets arguably engage more in joint actions that require 
fine-grained action coordination than do other nonhu-
man primates. For instance, all group members carry 
infants, and the transfer of an infant from one carrier to 
another is a frequent and highly coordinated joint action 
(Snowdon, 2001). Marmosets also engage extensively in 
cooperative vocal turn taking, which requires that they 
take each other’s responses into account (Takahashi, 
Narayanan, & Ghazanfar, 2013). Furthermore, these mon-
keys engage in action observation and imitation (Voelkl 
& Huber, 2007) and joint attention (Burkart & Heschl, 
2006, 2007), and they perceive agency (Burkart, 
Kupferberg, Glasauer, & van Schaik, 2012). Since mar-
mosets satisfy these requirements for corepresentation 
in a joint task as identified by Sebanz et al. (2006), we 
hypothesized that they would show a joint Simon effect. 
To further help disentangle whether such an effect was 
better explained as a true social effect or by low-level 
perceptual processes, we included a social control condi-
tion in which a conspecific partner was present but not 
engaged in the cooperative task.
Another important aspect of human cooperation is 
that it is often accompanied by social monitoring. For 
instance, communication allows children to effectively 
coordinate their joint efforts (Duguid, Wyman, Bullinger, 
Herfurth-Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014), which may 
be reflected in subtle communicative signals, such as 
gaze alternation, back checking, or mutual gaze 
(Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013). We therefore 
also coded the gazing behavior of the subjects during 
the social task conditions (joint and joint control task) 
to further disentangle low-level perceptual and social 
explanations of a potential joint Simon effect. If the 
subjects perceived the joint but not the joint control 
condition as a shared task, we predicted that the focal 
individual would check back at (i.e., look at) its partner 
more in the joint task than in the joint control task. 
Furthermore, a particularly strong indication for expe-
riencing the joint task as a shared task would be if the 
focal individual also engaged more in mutual gaze with 
its partner prior to responding to the cue.
Method
Subjects
We tested 10 (5 female, 5 male) adult common marmo-
sets (Callithrix jacchus) from three family groups (Table 
1). All individuals were born in captivity and housed 
in heated indoor enclosures. They were tested either 
in the morning or in the afternoon in their home enclo-
sure in between regular feedings. As rewards, we used 
various special treats that were highly preferred by the 
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particular subject, as established prior to the tests, 
mostly mealworms, nuts, crickets, or sweet fruits. The 
dyads in the joint and the joint control task were chosen 
according to observations of behavior during the train-
ing phase, such as spending time together in the testing 
cage, participating next to each other in trials, and 
occasionally sharing food. The research was approved 
by the Kantonales Veterinäramt Zürich (License No. 
ZH183/13, 24826).
Apparatus and stimuli
We tested the common marmosets with an auditory 
version of the Simon task. The tests were conducted in 
a testing cage (74 cm × 40 cm × 40 cm) that was placed 
inside the marmosets’ indoor enclosure, attached to the 
wire mesh such that subjects could reach and pull the 
drawers (Figs. 1 and 2). The subjects could be separated 
in three different compartments of the testing cage by 
using sliding doors, but visual contact between indi-
viduals was always possible. The response device con-
sisted of two drawers that were attached to an apparatus 
that was placed in front of the testing cage and was 
connected to a laptop. When the correct drawer was 
pulled, the subjects could retrieve a reward from the 
food bowl. In the joint task condition (see below), both 
individuals were rewarded if the correct drawer was 
pulled, in order to signal the cooperative nature of the 
task. Accordingly, after the drawer was pulled within 
Table 1. Description of Test Subjects
Name
Age (in 
years) at 
time of 
testing Sex
Social 
status
Partner in 
the joint and 
joint control 
task
Family group A
Jojoba 9 Female Breeder Marvin
Marvin 8 Male Breeder Jojoba
Jupie 6 Female Helper Jet
Jet 6 Male Helper Jupie
Joyce 2 Female Helper James
James 2 Male Helper Joyce
Family group B
Lea 8 Female Breeder Kyros
Kyros 7 Male Breeder Lea
Lima 0.6 Female Infant Not 
tested
Family group C
Jaja 6 Female Breeder Membo
Membo 6 Male Breeder Jaja
Jandira 0.7 Female Infant Not tested
Jala 0.7 Female Infant Not tested
Fig. 1. Schematic drawing of the setup for the training phase, with the loudspeaker 
placed in a central position in front of the subjects. Depending on the sound stimulus, 
the individuals had to make the correct choice between the right-hand and the left-hand 
drawer in order to obtain the bait.
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reach, the outer food bowl was available to the active 
puller, and the inner food bowl was available to its 
partner (Fig. 2).
The trials were presented with OpenSesame (Mathôt, 
Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), a Python-based experimen-
tal testing environment that recorded the subjects’ 
answers as soon as one drawer was pulled. For the 
testing setup, a screen was added so that the drawers 
could not be reached by the subjects before the screen 
was lifted, and the baiting procedure as well as the bait 
itself were not visible to the subjects.
As auditory stimuli, we used two different piano tone 
sequences “L” and “R” (see the Supplemental Material avail-
able online). They were considered as appropriate stimuli 
because their frequencies were within the most common 
hearing range of common marmosets (M. Osmanski, 
personal communication, February 26, 2015; Osmanski, 
Song, & Wang, 2013; Osmanski & Wang, 2011).
Experimental design
The task consisted of two experimental (full task and 
joint task) and two control (half task and joint control 
task) conditions (Fig. 3). If the marmosets corepre-
sented each other’s actions, they should show a com-
patibility effect (i.e., Simon effect) in the experimental 
conditions but not in the control conditions. We added 
the joint control task condition to control for the pos-
sibility that the joint Simon effect may exclusively result 
from low-level perceptual processes, independently of 
whether a partner was indeed engaged in the joint task 
or not. In this condition, a marmoset partner was pres-
ent but could not collaborate in the task (Fig. 3d). We 
therefore expected no compatibility effect in this joint 
control condition.
Procedure
Training. The training started with a habituation phase, 
in which the subjects were familiarized with the experi-
menter, the testing cage, and the whole testing procedure, 
including separation and opening and closing of sliding 
doors. The second phase consisted of training the marmo-
sets to the full task with the sound stimuli coming from a 
central position (loudspeaker in front of the individuals; 
Fig. 1), thus without eliciting stimulus incompatibility.
In a first training step, we made sure that all the 
subjects were able to correctly pull the drawers and 
that they made the association of pulling and getting a 
reward for it. We allowed the whole group to enter the 
testing cage and participate together (with open sliding 
doors) so that individuals could learn from each other 
how to pull and retrieve the rewards from the drawer. 
The criterion for each individual to move on with the 
next training step was to successfully pull at least seven 
times in a session.
In the second training step, we made sure that the 
subjects learned the association of the particular sound 
stimulus (tone sequence “L” or “R”) with the correct 
side (the left-hand or the right-hand drawer). We 
Outer Food Bowls
Inner Food Bowls
Fig. 2. Schematic drawing of the setup for the joint task situation.
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alternated sessions in which individuals were tested 
alone, in dyads, and in the entire group. In the begin-
ning, no screen was used so that the subjects could see 
the reward, and we played back the corresponding 
sound as soon as the subject pulled the baited drawer. 
The drawers were baited randomly with the constraint 
that the reward was not present more than twice in a 
row on the same side.
In the third training step, the screen was added to 
make sure the drawers could not be reached before the 
start of a trial and that the subjects could not observe 
which drawer was baited. The subjects were now tested 
individually, and a trial started with the sound stimulus. 
Simultaneously, the screen was lifted, but the bait was 
still invisibly covered. If the subject chose the correct 
drawer, it was allowed to retrieve the reward and con-
sume it, after which the next trial started. If the subject 
chose the incorrect drawer, the subject could check that 
the food bowl was empty, after which the screen was 
lowered. Training sessions lasted for 10 to 24 trials 
(maximum 15 min), depending on the motivation of 
the tested subject, and always ended with a correct 
choice by the subjects so they could finish with a posi-
tive experience. The criterion for starting the actual tests 
was to reach six sessions with at least 75% correct 
choices or 15 sessions with at least 70% correct choices.
Testing. The test sessions were identical to the training 
session (third step), except that the stimuli were no lon-
ger broadcast from the central position but from either 
b
Half Task
a
Full Task
d
Joint-Control Task
c
Joint Task
RightLeft
RightLeft
RightLeft
RightLeft
Fig. 3. Schematic drawing of the four different test conditions: (a) full task, (b) half task, (c) joint task, and (d) joint control task. The 
auditory stimuli “L” and “R” were broadcast from lateral speakers: Stimulus “L” signaled that the left-hand drawer was baited, whereas 
stimulus “R” signaled that right-hand drawer was baited. Broadcasting the stimuli from either the right- or left-hand side resulted in 
compatible trials (e.g., “L” played back from the left-hand side) and incompatible trials (e.g., “L” played back from the right-hand side). 
All tasks contained compatible and incompatible trials. In the full task (a), the focal individual had to solve the task alone. Here, we 
expected a compatibility effect (i.e., a Simon effect). In the half task (b), the focal individual had access to only half of the task, and 
we expected no Simon effect. In the joint task (c), the situation for the focal individual was the same as in the half task, but the second 
half of the task was solved by a second marmoset. Here, we expected a joint Simon effect. The joint control task (d) was identical to 
the joint task, but now the partner was prevented from responding to the stimuli because the access to its drawer was blocked by a 
wooden board. Here, we expected no Simon effect in the focal individual because the two subjects were no longer working together 
on the task.
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the left- or the right-hand side. Each subject was tested in 
all four conditions. In each test session (consisting of 
10–24 trials depending on the motivation of the tested 
subjects), the subjects were presented with one condi-
tion. One round of testing consisted of four test sessions 
corresponding to the four conditions, and the subjects 
were tested over five (family group) or four (breeding 
pairs) rounds. The interval between the sessions was 2 to 
3 days.
The order of the test conditions within a round, the 
side from which the stimulus was emitted, and the side 
of the focal individual and the partner during the joint 
and the joint control sessions were counterbalanced. 
The order of the two sound stimuli in a session was 
randomized to prevent side biases.
Each session started with a few warm-up pretrials, 
in which the sound stimuli were emitted from a central 
position (like in the training phase). Simultaneously, 
the experimenter pushed both drawers within reach of 
the subjects, allowing them to explore the food bowls 
on both sides and to retrieve the reward from the 
drawer. Next, the experimenter performed motivation 
pretrials (with sound stimuli still coming from a central 
position). In these motivation pretrials, the subjects had 
to pull the drawer themselves. If the subject chose the 
correct drawer, it was allowed to retrieve the reward 
and consume it. If the subject chose the incorrect 
drawer, the subject could check that the food bowl was 
empty. The criterion for starting the session on the 
particular day was to perform at least two consecutive 
correct choices in these motivation pretrials. If this cri-
terion was not met, the subject was tested the following 
day.
Before starting a trial, the subject was attracted to 
the front and the middle of the testing cage. The sound 
stimulus was then played back from either the left or 
the right loudspeaker, and simultaneously, the screen 
was lifted but the bait was still covered. A trial ended 
either when the test subject (or one of the two test 
subjects) pulled one of the two drawers, thus asking 
for an exclusive choice in each trial, or after 30 s. If 
they made the correct choice, they were allowed to 
retrieve the rewards and consume them, after which 
the next trial started. If they made the incorrect choice, 
the subjects could check that the food bowls were 
empty, after which the screen was lowered, and there 
was a pause of 10 s to 15 s before the next trial started.
Data coding. The choices of the subjects were auto-
matically recorded with OpenSesame. In addition, all ses-
sions were video-recorded. Gazing behavior was quantified 
from the video recordings with Mangold INTERACT soft-
ware (Mangold International, 2017). We coded the direc-
tion of the first orienting response and the looking 
behavior. To assess the direction of the first orienting 
response, we coded for each trial whether the focal indi-
vidual had first headed to the left-hand or the right-hand 
side, defined as (a) turning the head toward that side and 
making at least two steps in that direction or (b) extending 
the arm toward a food bowl (whichever happened first). 
For the trials of the joint and the joint control task, we fur-
ther coded for the time span between the sound stimulus 
and pulling (thus prior to responding to the cue), whether 
(a) the focal individual had looked at its partner and (b) the 
two individuals had mutually gazed at each other simulta-
neously. We coded occurrences (yes or no) per trial. We 
included only trials where it was the focal individual’s turn 
to pull (indicated by the respective sound stimulus) to 
exclude instances of looking at the partner that were elic-
ited by the partner’s intention movement to pull.
We assessed the interrater reliabilities for 20% of the 
recorded trials of all tasks for the subjects’ first orienting 
response directions (Cohen’s κ = .86), as well as for all 
the recorded trials of the joint and the joint control task 
for the gaze data (Cohen’s κ = .72).
Data analysis. We used two response variables to 
quantify a potential compatibility effect: the choice of a 
subject, which could either be correct or incorrect, and 
the direction of the first orienting response of the subject 
(i.e., the first two steps toward or the first reach for a 
drawer), which could also be correct or incorrect. We 
used generalized linear mixed models to test these effects 
and analyzed a total of 2,605 trials. We included compat-
ibility (compatible, incompatible) and task condition 
(full, half, joint, joint control) as fixed factors, with con-
trasts set to compare control task conditions (i.e., half 
and joint control task) against experimental task condi-
tions (i.e., full and joint task). We included the sound 
stimuli and the individuals nested within their family 
groups as random factors. We further included sex, age, 
session number, sound stimulus, and side as fixed factors 
in the model to control for any additional explanatory 
variables such as learning effects over sessions, prefer-
ences for one type of sound stimulus, or side biases.
For the subjects to react correctly in the half and the 
joint control task, answering included pulling the acces-
sible drawer (i.e., possible trials) when the correspond-
ing sound stimulus was emitted and not pulling when 
the sound stimulus of the blocked side (i.e., impossible 
trials) was played back. In the full and the joint task, 
both response options were accessible, and thus a cor-
rect answer was always possible. Coding a correct no 
pull in impossible trials of the half and the joint control 
task as a correct choice could arguably bias the results 
toward too many correct answers. However, such an 
effect would bias the results against our prediction and 
thus make the analysis more conservative. Additional 
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analyses furthermore suggested that such an effect was 
highly unlikely, because the pulling frequencies across 
the other tasks show that, when possible, the subjects 
would pull one of the response drawers in virtually 
every trial. A repeated measures analysis of variance 
on percentages of total no responses in all tasks 
revealed a significant difference between the experi-
mental task conditions (full and joint task) and the 
control task conditions (half and joint control task), F(3, 
36) = 10.42, p < .001, ω2 = .41. Within the half and the 
joint control task, respectively, there was almost double 
and fourfold no responses occurring in the impossible 
trials compared with the possible ones. Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests on percentages of total no pulls in 
the half and the joint control task showed that no 
responses occurred significantly more often in impos-
sible (M = 10.16%) than in possible (M = 5.24%) trials 
(p = .04, r = −.64). Nevertheless, no responses occurred 
in clearly less than 50% of all cases, which was consis-
tent with the difficulty for nonhuman primates to inhibit 
prepotent action tendencies.
Finally, we corroborated our findings by also analyz-
ing the direction of the first orienting response of the 
subjects. Note that for this response variable, no impos-
sible trials existed because the subjects could also ori-
ent toward the drawer toward which they had no 
access. The pattern of results for both response vari-
ables were identical.
Results
Simon effect across conditions
When using the choice of the subject as a binary 
response variable, we found that the full model 
explained the data better than the null model, χ2(16) = 
68.42, p < .001, and we found a significant main effect 
of compatibility (estimate = 0.21, SE = 0.04, z = 5.23, 
p < .001) as well as a significant Task × Compatibility 
interaction (estimate = 0.20, SE = 0.04, z = 4.92, p < .001; 
Fig. 4). All other fixed factors had no effect on the sub-
jects’ choices (Table 2). We found the same pattern of 
results when using the direction of the subjects’ first 
orienting response as a response variable, χ2(16) = 
72.37, p < .001 (Fig. 5; Table 3). Thus, both the choice 
behavior of the subjects as well as the direction of their 
first orienting response when approaching the apparatus 
were consistent with a compatibility effect in the full 
and the joint condition but not in the half and the joint 
control condition. The compatibility effects in the full 
and the joint tasks, but not in the half task or the joint 
control task, were a first indication that marmosets may 
corepresent each other’s actions and thus perceive the 
joint task as a task they share with each other.
Social monitoring
To further analyze whether the subjects really perceived 
the joint but not the joint control condition as a shared 
task, we tested whether the focal individual would (a) 
look at its partner more in the joint task than in the 
joint control task and (b) engage more in mutual gaze 
with the partner prior to responding to the cue.
We found that before pulling a drawer, the focal 
individuals indeed looked more often at their partner 
in the joint than in the joint control task, χ2(5) = 66.38, 
Task
Joint-ControlJointHalfFull
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Fig. 4. Compatibility effect (i.e., Simon effect) across the four task 
conditions, calculated as the difference in the percentage of incorrect 
choices between incompatible trials and compatible trials per individual 
and session. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks 
indicate results that the compatibility effect was significantly stronger in 
the full and the joint task compared with the control tasks (p < .001).
***
***
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Fig. 5. Compatibility effect (i.e., Simon effect) quantified for the 
direction of the first orienting response across the four task condi-
tions. The compatibility effect was calculated as the difference in the 
percentage of incorrect directions of first orienting responses between 
incompatible trials and compatible trials per session and sound stimu-
lus. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indi-
cate that the compatibility effect was significantly stronger in the 
full and the joint task compared with the control tasks (p < .001).
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Table 3. Results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model With Direction of the First Orienting Response as the Response 
Variable
Fixed effect Estimate SE
Odds 
ratio 95% CI z p
Intercept –.025 0.13  
Task  
 Experimental (full, joint) vs. control (half, joint control) –0.09 0.04 0.91 [0.85, 0.99] –2.10 .04*
 Experimental (full, joint) 0.05 0.06 1.05 [0.93, 1.18] 0.83 .40
 Control (half, joint control) 0.02 0.06 1.02 [0.91, 1.15] 0.37 .71
Compatibility –0.22 0.04 0.80 [0.74, 0.87] –5.21 1.86E–07
Side 0.08 0.08 1.08 [0.93, 1.27] 0.99 .32
Sound stimulus –0.14 0.08 0.87 [0.74, 1.02] –1.74 .08
Sex 0.01 0.08 1.01 [0.86, 1.18] 0.15 .88
Age –0.01 0.02 0.99 [0.95, 1.03] –0.41 .69
Session  
 Linear trend –0.04 0.10 0.96 [0.79, 1.17] –0.43 .67
 Quadratic trend –0.03 0.09 0.97 [0.81, 1.16] –0.28 .78
 Cubic trend –0.06 0.09 0.94 [0.79, 1.12] –0.67 .50
 Quartic trend 0.04 0.09 1.04 [0.87, 1.24] 0.45 .65
Compatibility × Task interactions  
 Compatibility × Experimental Tasks vs. Control Tasks –0.23 0.04 0.79 [0.73, 0.86] –5.44 5.44E–08
 Compatibility × Full Task vs. Joint Task 0.09 0.06 1.09 [0.97, 1.23] 1.59 .11
 Compatibility × Half Task vs. Joint Control Task 0.00 0.06 1 [0.89, 1.12] 0.05 .96
Note: CI = confidence interval.
Table 2. Results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model With Choice of the Subject as the Response Variable
Fixed effect Estimate SE Odds ratio 95% CI z p
Intercept 0.23 0.16  
Task  
 Experimental (full, joint) vs. control (half, joint control) 0.06 0.04 1.06 [0.98, 1.15] 1.38 .17
 Experimental (full, joint) –0.02 0.06 0.98 [0.87, 1.10] –0.34 .74
 Control (half, joint control) 0.05 0.06 1.05 [0.93, 1.18] 0.86 .39
Compatibility 0.21 0.04 1.23 [1.14, 1.33] 5.23 1.71E–07
Side –0.09 0.08 0.91 [0.78, 1.07] –1.06 .29
Sound stimulus –0.07 0.04 0.93 [0.86, 1.01] –1.64 .10
Sex 0.03 0.08 1.03 [0.88, 1.21] 0.37 .71
Age 0.01 0.02 1.01 [0.97, 1.05] 0.52 .60
Session  
 Linear trend –0.09 0.10 0.91 [0.75, 1.11] –0.95 .34
 Quadratic trend –0.04 0.09 0.96 [0.81, 1.15] –0.45 .65
 Cubic trend 0.13 0.09 1.14 [0.95, 1.36] 1.38 .17
 Quartic trend –0.11 0.09 0.90 [0.75, 1.07] –1.27 .20
Compatibility × Task interactions  
 Compatibility × Experimental Tasks vs. Control Tasks 0.20 0.04 1.22 [1.13, 1.32] 4.92 8.83E–07
 Compatibility × Full Task vs. Joint Task –0.11 0.06 0.90 [0.80, 1.01] –1.92 .06
Note: CI = confidence interval.
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p < .001 (Fig. 6a; Table 4). Moreover, they were also 
more likely to engage in mutual gaze in the joint task, 
χ2(5) = 13.99, p < .05 (Figs. 6a and 6b; Table 5).
Discussion
We found that common marmosets show a robust joint 
Simon effect. This suggests that action corepresentation 
is not unique to humans but is also present in another 
highly cooperative primate. The effect was detectable 
only when the partner was coengaged in the task and 
was not elicited by its mere presence (in the joint control 
task). Furthermore, before making a behavioral decision, 
the marmosets were more likely to look back at their 
partner and engage in mutual gaze in the joint task, and 
they were less likely to do so in the joint control task, 
where the partner was not coengaged in the task. 
Together, these results suggest that the mere presence of 
a partner was not sufficient to elicit the joint Simon effect. 
Rather, what was needed was a partner that was coen-
gaged in the task. Therefore, the joint Simon effect in this 
study appears not to be the result of low-level perceptual 
processes only but of coengagement in the task.
The presence of a joint Simon effect in marmosets 
may suggest that action corepresentation does not 
require having a full-fledged theory of mind, because 
this is unlikely in these monkeys (Burkart & Heschl, 
2007). Nevertheless, they have some understanding of 
others as intentional agents (Burkart et al., 2012), which 
thus supports the proposal of Stenzel et al. (2014) that 
such a perception of agency is sufficient for a joint 
Simon effect. However, recent results also suggest that 
primate theory-of-mind understanding may have been 
underestimated in the past. For instance, Krupenye, Kano, 
Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (2016) found false-belief 
understanding in great apes in an anticipatory-looking 
Table 4. Results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model With Looking at Partner as the 
Response Variable
Fixed effect Estimate SE
Odds 
ratio 95% CI z p
Intercept –0.01 0.20  
Joint task vs. joint control task –0.95 0.15 0.39 [0.29, 0.52] –6.12 9.15E–10
Compatibility –0.35 0.08 0.70 [0.60, 0.82] –4.23 2.30E–05
Sex –0.25 0.14 0.78 [0.59, 1.02] –1.82 .07
Age 0.02 0.03 1.02 [0.96, 1.08] 0.57 .57
Compatibility × Task interaction –0.05 0.15 0.95 [0.71, 1.28] –0.33 .74
Note: CI = confidence interval.
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Fig. 6. Mutual gazing. The mean percentage of trials in which focal individuals looked at their partner or both partners looked at 
each other simultaneously (a) is shown as a function of task. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indicate 
significant differences between tasks (*p < 05, ***p < .001). An example of mutual gazing prior to responding to the cue in a trial of 
the joint task (drawn from a still frame from a test video clip) is also shown (b).
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paradigm, similar to findings in young human children. 
To what extent primates, including marmosets, possess 
theory-of-mind abilities therefore continues to be an 
open question, as well as the role of such abilities in 
producing the joint Simon effect.
The marmosets in our task obtained a reward for 
each correct response. In human studies, participants 
are given a verbal instruction and then solve the task 
without reward or sometimes with an acoustic and 
often with a visual feedback stimulus indicating a cor-
rect or wrong response (Lien et al., 2015; Stenzel et al., 
2012; joint flanker: Atmaca et  al., 2011). In the joint 
condition, the marmosets were jointly rewarded for a 
correct response. This was done to increase the percep-
tion of the task as a joint task and may differ from 
studies with humans, in particular when no feedback 
stimulus is used. If visual or acoustic feedback is used, 
it is available to both partners, which is arguably closer 
to the marmoset situation in our study. Both with and 
without feedback, however, a correct solution may well 
be perceived as rewarding by both human partners in 
the joint task, namely when the verbal instruction or 
task setting implicitly or explicitly prompts the percep-
tion of the task as a shared goal. To fully understand 
the influence of the reward structure on the Simon 
effect in both humans and marmosets, researchers will 
need to conduct additional studies that systematically 
vary this factor.
The result that marmosets in the joint compared with 
the joint control task looked more at their partner and 
engaged in mutual gaze prior to responding is intrigu-
ing because a directed gaze is typically perceived as a 
threat in nonhuman primates (Coss, Marks, & Ramakrishnan, 
2002). The gaze pattern in marmoset monkeys, however, 
may suggest the working hypothesis that, like humans 
(Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, & Call, 2007; Wyman et al., 
2013) but unlike great apes (Bullinger, Wyman, Melis, 
& Tomasello, 2011; Duguid et al., 2014), marmosets may 
use mutual gaze to coordinate their behaviors. Such a 
propensity to pay close attention to a cooperation part-
ner and its attention could have evolved in marmosets 
to support the routine coordination of behavior in space 
and time in their daily lives, in particular during infant 
transfers (Snowdon, 2001). Our results, together with 
the propensity of marmosets to engage in cooperative 
vocal turn taking (Takahashi et al., 2013), suggest that 
they are more than accidental cooperators but indeed 
engage jointly in a cooperative task.
In sum, we demonstrated that the joint Simon effect 
and thus corepresentation during joint task perfor-
mance is not unique to humans. This raises the question 
of the evolutionary origin of corepresentation and why 
we find it in both humans and marmoset monkeys. One 
possibility is that it may have evolved convergently in 
humans and marmosets, because they are both true 
cooperative breeders and therefore routinely engage in 
cooperative activities that require coordinated actions 
(Burkart, Hrdy, & van Schaik, 2009; Burkart & van 
Schaik, 2016).
Another possibility is that it simply represents a pri-
mate universal and that dyads of any nonhuman pri-
mate species would also show a joint Simon effect, 
given that they are able to engage in a joint task. This 
scenario is not unlikely given the contribution of low-
level attentional processes to the joint Simon task (Dolk 
et al., 2014). To further disentangle these alternatives, 
it is thus crucial to use a joint Simon task to test inde-
pendently breeding nonhuman primates who do not 
regularly engage in close coordinated and cooperative 
interactions.
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